


# Flying into trouble?

Mr Richard Flint




# Institute of Medicine 1999



- 44000 to 98000 deaths per year
- A jumbo jet crashing each day

# Reports



- Checklist
- Audit
- Integrating operating room displays
- Beta blockers
- Retained items in surgery
- US for central line insertion

# Flying in the 1950s



# Flying in the 1970s



# Pilots are not god

NASA Technical Memorandum 78482

A Simulator Study of the Interaction  
of Pilot Workload With Errors,  
Vigilance, and Decisions

H. P. Ruffell Smith

JANUARY 1979



**NASA**

- Commissioned a NASA simulator
- 20 three-man crews
- Simulated a transatlantic flight from NY
- Difficulties resulted from poor teamwork

Whenever you solve a problem, you usually create one. You can only hope that the one you created is less critical than the one you eliminated.

Earl Weiner







# Airbus A330 203



- Fly by wire
- Flight envelope
- Flight modes
  - Normal
  - Alternate 1
  - Alternate 2

# Pilots



Captain Marc Dubois (58yo)  
Air France 1988  
10,988 hours



David Robert (37yo)  
Air France 1998  
6,547 hours



Pierre-Cedric Bonin (32yo)  
Air France 2003  
2,936 hours



**Air France 447**  
**31<sup>st</sup> May 2009**  
**729pm**

✈ 10 h 50 min

Rio de Janeiro - State of Rio de Janeiro


Paris

Google









# Electronic calvary charge of warnings

Time of Reception	ACARS Message	Interpretation
02:10:10	AUTO FLT AP OFF	Warning: Autopilot has disengaged
02:10:16	AUTO FLT REAC W/S DET FAULT	Warning: Reactive wind shear detection system is inoperative
02:10:23	F/CTL ALTN LAW	Warning: Flight Control has switched to alternate law
02:10:29	FLAG ON CAPT PFD SPD LIMIT	Warning: Speed limit in airspeed tape of Captain's PFD is no longer available
02:10:41	FLAG ON F/O PFD SPD LIMIT	Warning: Speed limit in airspeed tape of First Officer's PFD is no longer available
02:10:47	AUTO FLT A/THR OFF	Warning: Autothrottle has disengaged.
02:10:54	NAV TCAS FAULT	Warning: TCAS is inoperative
02:11:00	FLAG ON CAPT PFD FD	Warning: Flight Director on Captain's PFD is inoperative, flagged by red
02:11:15	FLAG ON F/O PFD FD	Warning: Flight Director on First Officer's PFD is inoperative, flagged by red
02:11:21	F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT	Warning: Rudder travel limiter error, rudder-deflection-limit calculation is no longer possible
02:11:27	MAINTENANCE STATUS EFCS 2	Warning: Maintenance Status of Electronic Flight Control System #2
02:11:42	MAINTENANCE STATUS EFCS 1	Warning: Maintenance Status of Electronic Flight Control System #2
02:11:49	AFS PROBE-PITOT 1X2/2X3/1X3 (9DA),HARD	Failure: Automatic Flight System, failure of pitot tubes
02:11:55	EFCS1 X2.EFCS2X FCPC2 (2CE2)/WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2.HARD	Failure: Electric Flight Control System #1-#2, Flight Control Primary Computer #2, ADIRU #1, comm. Air Data Reference #1-#2 to FCPC #2 have failed

02:12:10	FLAG ON CAPT PFD FPV	Warning: Flight Path Vector removed from Captain's PFD, flagged by red
02:12:16	FLAG ON F/O PFD FPV	Warning: Flight Path Vector removed from First Officer's PFD, flagged by red
02:12:51	NAV ADR DISAGREE	Warning: ADIRU units disagree on flight parameters
02:13:08	SIS 1 ISIS(22FN-10FC) SPEED OR MACH FUNCTION.HARD	Failure: ISIS #1, Speed or Mach function have failed
02:13:14	IR2 1.EFCS1X.JR1.JR3 ADIRU2 (1FP2),HARD	Failure: Inertial Reference (IR) #2 #1 #3, EFCS #1 have failed
02:13:45	F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT	Warning: Primary Flight Control Computer #1 is no longer functional
02:13:51	F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT	Warning: Secondary Flight Control Computer #1 is no longer functional
02:14:14	MAINTENANCE STATUS ADR 2	Warning: Maintenance status Air Data Reference #2
02:14:20	AFS 1 FMGEC1(1CA1).INTERMITTENT	Failure: Automatic Flight System #1, Flight Management Guidance and Envelope Computer #1 are no longer operative
02:14:26	ADVISORY CABIN VERTICAL SPEED	Warning: Cabin pressure changes at a rate of 1800 feet/minute or greater for 5 seconds.



# Response

2:10:06 Bonin takes control.  
Climbs steeply. Stall warning!

2:10:16 Robert recognises loss of  
speed indicators

2:10:27 Robert recognises  
climbing and calls for Bonin to  
level.

2:10:38 Stall warning stops. Plane  
under control



# Response

2:10:55 Pitot functioning

2:11:21 Plane reaches maximum altitude. Starts to fall with nose up

2:11:37 “Left seat taking control”



# Response

2:10:55 Pitot functioning

2:11:21 Plane reaches maximum altitude. Starts to fall with nose up

2:11:37 “Left seat taking control”



# Response

2:11:43 Captain on deck

“We have lost control of the plane”

2:11:47 Stall warning ceases. Falling at  
35000ft

2:12:15. Recognise falling. Robert pushes  
nose down. No response

# Response

2:13:40 Pass through 10000ft

(Robert) “Climb...climb...climb...climb”

(Bonin) “But I’ve had the stick back the whole time”



(Dubois)” No, no, no...”

2:14:23 “Damn it, we’re going to crash...This can’t be happening”

2:14:25 (Bonin) “But what’s happening”



2:14:28





# What can we learn

“Processes reduce workload when it is low,  
but increase it when workload is high.”

# What can we learn

“It takes an airplane to bring out the worst in a pilot”

What can we learn

Professionalism must be maintained

# What can we learn

Exotic devices create exotic problems

# Summary

- Process of surgical safety is borrowing from ideas developed in the airline industry
- Automation in this industry has not alleviated all risk
- When process fail, salvage is difficult
- Salvage will depend on how the doctor reacts
- Staff must always be vigilant (doctors need to doctor)
- Don't rely on the process

